I. Introduction
Almost all models of economic development incorporate a critical role for savings and capital accumulation. Several theorists of the lowlevel-equilibrium trap adopt the simplification that all income is consumed until a critical level is reached while a fixed proportion of income above this level is saved.' Writers in the dual-economy tradition originated by Lewis (1954) assume that saving is undertaken only from profit income.2 This assumption can be justified by the notion that capitalists are rich while workers are poor and the rich save relatively more. In this case, the saving-from-profit assumption originates from subsistence considerations similar to those stressed in the literature on the low-level-equilibrium trap. Alternatively this view can also be argued on the basis that capitalists have access to investment opportunities with higher returns.3 This paper presents and analyzes two complementary theories stressing the effect on saving of the physiological consequences of poor nutrition associated with low incomes. Both hypotheses introduce the possibility that the poor may save proportionately less than the rich.4 One influence of nutrition is on the probability of surviving into the future to enjoy benefits of past saving, a relationship discussed in Section II.5 A second impact of nutrition is on the ability to earn current income through its effect on a worker's productivity. The implications of a relationship between nutrition and productivity for the operation of labor markets is referred to as the "efficiency wage" theory.6 Section III examines the consequences of this factor for saving behavior.7
These models indicate some considerations that should be given attention in the specification of empirical saving functions when nutritional factors are operative. The empirical research on saving in LDCs has usually adopted without modification the two popular specifications (life-cycle and permanent-income) applied to developed countries.8 The conventional empirical formulations of these models assume that the average propensity to save is independent of lifetime 3 For a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of this view, see Bhalla (1978) . He concludes that differences in the saving propensities from different types of income may indeed derive from differences in investment opportunities. 4 There are several other hypotheses about why the rich may save relatively more than the poor. If there were income uncertainty and the degree of risk aversion changed with income, the average propensity to save would depend on income. Whether the predicted pattern would correspond to the assumptions of development literature deserves investigation. Another explanation is the relationship between savings in physical and financial assets and the opportunities for investment in human capital. Poor individuals may have higher returns to human capital and may invest relatively more of their income in education than in other assets. Finally, Blinder (1975) argues that bequests may be a luxury good. Bhalla (1978 Bhalla ( , 1979 Bhalla ( , 1980 , and Musgrove (1978 Musgrove ( , 1979 . All these authors give attention to a subsistence level of consumption that must be met before saving is undertaken, although the all-or-nothing attribute of this approach is more rigid than that pursued in this paper. In addition, Bhalla (1980) provides evidence on more general nonlinearities in the saving function. Finally, it should be noted that Lluch et al. (1977) give special attention to the role of relative prices in affecting saving behavior. The empirical results of this volume indicate an important role for the relative price of food on saving. As indicated in the conclusion, the models of Sections II and III point to a more general theoretical framework for understanding the role of relative prices, especially for food.
II. Savings and the Length of Life
One influence on the decision to save is uncertainty about living to enjoy future consumption. The probability of survival may respond to an individual's standard of living at very low income levels.9 In this case the average propensity to save (w) will depend on the level of income in situations when it would otherwise not do so. The intuition is that individuals will favor current consumption because it contributes to utility both directly and by promoting survival. These effects are likely to be stronger for poorer individuals who will save proportionately less than richer ones, so the average propensity to save will rise with income. As the following analysis shows, the issues are more complex than this argument suggests, and its conclusion holds only if the marginal survival probability is sufficiently elastic or if certain threshold effects prevail.
Consider an individual living for at most two periods and receiving income (y) only in the first period. This income is divided between consumption in the first period (cl) and savings (s) for consumption in the second period (c2): 
The marginal benefit of increasing cl (the first two terms) incorporates both the increase in first-period utility and the increase in expected second-period utility from an increase in the probability of survival. A sufficient condition for a maximum is that the probability of survival increase at a decreasing rate, as seems natural (Qr" -0). the case of a general utility function, a positive interest rate, and endogenous survival. However, for a zero interest rate and an isoelastic utility function, the average propensity to save rises with income if'3 My + X (-q -1) > 0,
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A sufficient condition is that rq > 1. Intuitively, if the marginal probability of survival declines sufficiently rapidly in response to firstperiod consumption, the individual will want to increase secondperiod consumption more than proportionately as income rises. Individuals with y such that cl < c-1 always have a lower average propensity to save than those individuals with a y sufficiently high that cl > c-1, if utility is isoelastic. A second sufficient condition for this threshold effect is that the interest rate equals the discount rate at c8i, given here by (1 -#,r)kr, but more generally greater than this if there are reasons for discounting other than uncertain survival. So far I have assumed that life-contingent annuities do not exist. An individual dying before the second period leaves his savings as an undesired bequest. Annuities are uncommon in LDCs, where endogenous survival is most important, but deserve attention for several reasons. First, the family may function like an annuity market by providing for consumption of its older members in return for their assets, as argued by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) . Indeed, the relative prevalence of extended families in LDCs, with their superior ability to approximate an annuities market due to large numbers, may be related to the absence of these markets. The following discussion of annuities can represent this role of the family. Second, if no institution performs the function of an annuities market, the cases discussed below provide reference points for analyzing welfare losses resulting from the absence of annuities. Insight is obtained into how and why these markets may break down and especially into who loses relatively most. Finally, past research on savings and uncertain lifetimes has focused on this issue, and previous conclusions are modified by endogenous survival.
A life-contingent annuity is a contract whereby an individual exchanges his savings for a payment in the second period (C2) if he survives. The value of Rs is a proportion (P) of c2, since c2 is contingent:
Two cases must be considered: annuity vendors can monitor cl, thereby knowing the true 7r of each customer, or they cannot. In either case, the annuity market is assumed to be competitive and annuities are actuarially fair so that if individuals are identical, only one annuity contract is offered and P= .
Regardless of the monitoring of 7r, the individual faces the budget constraint (1) with c2 defined by (2b) and chooses cl and s to maximize lifetime utility (4). If annuity vendors cannot monitor cl, then the individual consumer is offered a p regardless of his choice of c 1. The first-order condition is
If the annuity is fair, then Or = p in equilibrium. If Or were constant, (5b) would reduce to (5a'), the first-order condition if individuals always survive. This result is the Barro and Friedman (1977) conclusion: with a zero interest rate, a fair annuity, and an exogenous survival probability, the chosen consumption levels in each period are equal to each other, although from (2b) and (9) their common value depends on the survival probability. Equation (5b) makes clear that this result does not generalize to the situation of endogenous probabilities. The individual still has an incentive to respond to the effect of cl on utility via its effect on survival. Where annuities are available but cl is not monitored, a sufficient condition for the average saving propensity to rise with income is -q > 1, as in (7).14 If individuals have different incomes and cl cannot be monitored, all individuals cannot be offered fair annuities. If only one annuity is offered, it must, in the aggregate, allow vendors to break even. Since drrldy > 0, the rich have a 7r above the common p and are subsidized by the poor. This problem need not be so severe as to lead to a complete disappearance of annuities since any contract with p < 1 is better than none, even for the poorest individual with a very low 'a. However, the family may be better placed to know cl, thereby supplanting these markets.
If annuity vendors can monitor ci, then the individual consumer optimizes realizing that p depends on cl and so (9) constrains the optimization. The first-order condition is u'(cV) + T'Uu(c2) -R(1 + C21r')U'(C2) = 0.
(5c)
The improvement in the operation of annuity markets lowers cl (i.e., relative to [5b]), and savings are higher. The Barro-Friedman result does not obtain even in this case of perfect annuity markets. Finally, if the interest rate is zero and utility is isoelastic, a sufficient condition for the average saving propensity to rise with income is -q > 1. 15 Regardless of the nature of annuity markets, therefore, an endogenous survival probability means that the average propensity to save depends on income levels. The value of the elasticity of the marginal survival probability is crucial in determining whether the average propensity rises with income, ri> 1 being a sufficient condition in all cases.
Finally, there is the issue of effects on mortality that are exogenous to an individual's behavior, for instance, environmental differences or variations in public health measures. If the probability of survival is exogenous but less than one, an increase in it always increases savings. 
III. Savings and Productivity
The literature on the efficiency wage analyzes labor market equilibrium when the productivity of a worker depends on his wage. Although consumption behavior of the worker is not specified, it is 15 Totally differentiating eqq. (1), (2b), and (5c), using (6), and substituting the firstorder condition back into the expression for dw/dy yields Xii(kv -1) + (1 + c21')-y > 0 as a necessary and sufficient condition. 16 Assume that the probability of survival depends both on first-period consumption and on an exogenous factor ,3, ir = sr(c1, ,3) with of > 0. Using eqq. assumed that a higher wage means more consumption and, through a physiological effect, greater productivity per hour worked. Past research has focused on the possibility of unemployment resulting from a minimum physiologically efficient wage and the consequences for cost-benefit analysis and other aspects of policy. In this section, the emphasis is on the implications of the consumption-efficiency link for the saving behavior of an individual worker. Greater current consumption adds to utility directly and indirectly by increasing income, thereby creating a bias against saving. An intuitive hypothesis is that these effects will be relatively more important for poorer individuals and that the average propensity to save will rise with income. As in the preceding section, however, further analysis reveals additional offsetting factors and, in particular, a distinction between wage and nonwage income proves important.
The efficiency of work per period depends on consumption in the first period when all work is done: In the general case, the effect of an increase in nonlabor income on the average propensity to save is ambiguous, but for an isoelastic utility function total differentiation and substitution of (14) Finally, there may be a level of first-period consumption such that hi = 0 for consumption above this level. Individuals with a w and a combination such that they consume at or above this threshold always have an average propensity to save above that of individuals whose consumption is below this level if utility is isoelastic (or if the interest rate equals the discount rate, here assumed zero but more generally positive). Denote by wr(a) the value of w at which this threshold is reached.
Efficiency may depend both on first-period consumption and on an exogenous factor 3 representing an increase in efficiency resulting from, say, better public health, hp > 0. If hc, = 0, then an increase in earnings. Effort is assumed not to create disutility, otherwise it would be zero. The employer knows average consumption (cI) and effort and pays the average worker wh(FI) so that y = wh(FI') + a.
(13')
The average worker takes y as given regardless of his own actions and chooses cI and c2 to maximize V subject to (13'), yielding
Equilibrium is given by (13'), (14'), and c, = c,. This formulation of a breakdown in the monitoring of effort is extremely simple, but it yields a set of phenomena that would occur even if monitoring were possible but costly and imperfect.
,3 increases X if and only if an increase in a increases a. If h,, p < 0, do/da > 0 is a sufficient condition for da/dd > 0, while if h,, 1> 0, do/df can be negative even if do/da > 0. So far only interior solutions with cl, c2 > 0 have been considered. Given the form of h that is assumed in the' efficiency-wage literature, there is the possibility of a corner solution with c2 = 0. This case arises because there is a physiologically determined wage that minimizes the cost of an efficiency unit of labor from the employer's point of view. Employers will never pay wages below this minimum, although competitive pressures may raise the equilibrium wage above the minimum.
Clearly the employer would never want c2> 0, since c2 contributes nothing to productivity. Given that c2 = 0, the level of cl that minimizes the cost of an efficiency unit of labor [cj/h(cj)] is given by h'(cl) = h(c*)Icl. If workers have no other income, employers set w = l/h'(c4) to maximize profits. As is well known, it may not be possible to employ all available labor at this wage and still maximize employers' profits, so that unemployment prevails (see Bliss and Stern 1978a) .
Of interest is that at w* = lh'(c*), the minimum wage per efficiency unit, workers do not want to undertake any saving as can be verified by substitution into equation (14). Alternatively, note that for w = w* the curve OADB in figure lb is entirely in the fourth quadrant except for points 0 and D, which lie on the x-axis, so that V is maximized with c2 = 0 at point D. The intuition is the same given earlier for condition (15). Thus an implication of the efficiency-wage theory of unemployment is that even employed workers save nothing.
A similar conclusion follows for all uses of income other than consumption by employed workers. For instance, income would never be used to provide for consumption of nonworking dependents such as small children and the aged. These extreme implications can be taken as casting doubt on the suggestion that LDC agriculture is characterized by an efficiency-wage unemployment equilibrium. Perhaps human physiology is such that h" is always negative so that point C of figure la is at the origin. In any case, the implausibility of an unemployment equilibrium need not undermine the possibility of the milder efficiency-of-work effects discussed above under the assumption of an interior solution.'8 18 Stiglitz (1976) discusses a single-period equilibrium in which a family maximizes its (additive) collective welfare. All members are potentially identical as workers in that their h(c) functions are the same. In this case, it is possible that all individuals will consume less than the efficiency-wage level, with consumption levels differing among individuals. Higher-consumption workers subsidize lower-consumption workers. They are willing and able to do this because the family has access to some rental income. Similarly, such a family may save. By contrast, the discussion in the text focuses on landless laborers.
If market pressures are such as to raise V above the value corresponding to the physiological minimum V, the competitive employer takes V as given. He will not want to interfere with the employee's choice of cl and c2 outlined in the preceding sections since these will minimize his own cost of providing V to his workers. As a consequence there is no need to modify the preceding partial-equilibrium analysis of the interior solution to include factors arising on the employer's side.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The two models presented in this paper open up a fairly rich set of possibilities. By way of summary, their implications for the average propensity to save are illustrated in figures 2a and 2b. While theoretical considerations are sufficient to establish a number of conclusions, the effects of many factors on saving behavior require empirical investigation to resolve theoretical ambiguities. Specific conclusions include the following:
1. The length-of-life hypothesis does not predict an increase in the average propensity to save at all income levels even for quite restrictive functional forms. The elasticity of the marginal survival probability (q) plays a crucial role in determining changes in this propensity. Even with perfect annuity markets, the average propensity can rise with income in contrast to conclusions of previous research based on exogenous survival probabilities.
2. If consumption does not affect survival beyond a certain threshold, however, the average propensity to save of individuals above the threshold is higher than that of all individuals below it, given certain sufficient conditions (isoelastic utility or equality of the interest rate and the discount rate).
3. In the efficiency model, the change in the average propensity to save depends crucially on the type of income considered. For nonwage income, the income elasticity of saving exceeds one for the special utility function u(x) = xy, 1 > -y > 0. But this result does not hold for wage income even though work time is supplied entirely inelastically. For this second type of income the elasticity of the marginal efficiency function (E) is important.
4. As in the length-of-life model, it seems reasonable to assume a threshold level of consumption beyond which efficiency is unaffected and the assumption of a constant average propensity is plausible.'9 Both threshold effects deserve attention in empirical work. 19 Contrast this view with the assumption that no saving occurs until a subsistence level of consumption is met, after which a constant fraction of all marginal income is saved. In this case, the average propensity always rises. 6. Influences on mortality and physiological efficiency that are exogenous from the individual's viewpoint (e.g., environmental or public health factors) are of great potential importance for saving behavior, as stressed by Ram and Schultz (1979) . These factors probably vary sufficiently on a regional basis in large countries to allow their incorporation in cross-sectional studies of savings. An improvement in public health will probably raise the average propensity to save, but this result need not prevail since it depends on interactions between public health and factors influencing mortality and efficiency under the individual's own control.
These models provide a framework for asking additional questions about saving behavior. Both models provide for an increasing average propensity to save without introducing market failures. But they also indicate that market failures may arise from an inability of annuity vendors or employers to monitor consumption and, in the second instance, work efficiency. Different policies can be tentatively suggested to remedy these breakdowns. If annuity markets are imperfect, one would suspect undersaving and a need for subsidization, while in the efficiency wage case oversaving and a need for taxation seem likely. These conjectures need further investigation.
While both models were developed with only one kind of consumption good, each suggests a distinction between goods that affect survival and efficiency and those that do not. Food is an obvious example of the former type of good. This extension indicates the possible role for relative prices in determining the average propensity to save. An intuitive conjecture is that an increase in the relative price of food would lower the average propensity to save by making it more costly to provide for survival or to be efficient in work. My preliminary calculations suggest that the effect is theoretically ambiguous, however, and empirical work will probably be needed to provide a resolution. Finally, the two areas of inquiry-market failures and two consumption goods-could be combined to raise and answer such questions as, If savings cannot be taxed or subsidized in a situation of market failure, can a second-best policy of interfering with food prices be justified?
